An Instrumenting Compiler for Enforcing Confidentiality in Low-Level Code by Brahmakshatriya, A. et al.
An Instrumenting Compiler for Enforcing

















We present an instrumenting compiler for enforcing data
confidentiality in low-level applications (e.g. those written
in C) in the presence of an active adversary. In our approach,
the programmer marks secret data by writing lightweight
annotations on top-level definitions in the source code. The
compiler then uses a static flow analysis coupled with ef-
ficient runtime instrumentation, a custom memory layout,
and custom control-flow integrity checks to prevent data
leaks even in the presence of low-level attacks.
We have implemented our scheme as part of the LLVM
compiler. We evaluate it on the SPEC micro-benchmarks for
performance, and on larger, real-world applications (includ-
ing OpenLDAP, which is around 300KLoC) for programmer
overhead required to restructure the application when pro-
tecting the sensitive data such as passwords. We find that
performance overheads introduced by our instrumentation
are moderate (average 12% on SPEC), and the programmer
effort to port OpenLDAP is only about 160 LoC.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of protecting confidentiality of
secret data in applications written in low-level languages
like C. Common examples of such applications include web
servers that compute with sensitive data such as passwords
and private files, medical software that work with private
medical records, database query engines, etc.
Such applications often use tools like encryption to pro-
tect the sensitive data outside of the application. For exam-
ple, webservers use SSL to protect the data from a network
adversary and databases can store encrypted data on disk.
However, in order to enable computation over it, sensitive
data must often be present in the clear in the application’s
memory. This makes the data vulnerable to logical bugs and
exploitable vulnerabilities in the application.
Broadly, this is a problem of information flow control [20]
in the presence of active adversaries. In this setting, a pro-
gram has (conceptually) separated public and private data,
and the goal is to ensure that private data does not leak to an
unprotected channel. This is a challenging problem because
leaks can occur due to many different reasons. To start, the
program may have bugs in its logic that accidentally leak
private data to a public channel (e.g. network_send (passwd)).
Further, low-level languages like C do not provide memory
safety or control flow integrity, making it possible for an
attacker to actively craft an exploit, hijack control of the
application and steal private data. The Heartbleed bug in
OpenSSL [5] is one prominent example of a buffer over-
flow vulnerability that can be exploited to obtain sensitive
data, but many other vulnerabilities and attacks have been
reported [1, 2, 4, 9, 39, 45].
Existing approaches for information flow control can
be broadly classified into static and dynamic. Static ap-
proaches [24, 40] label each variable in the program as public
or private, and a static analysis, such as a type system, pro-
hibits flows from private variables to public variables. Sound-
ness of the analysis guarantees that the program is infor-
mation flow secure. While this results in zero runtime over-
head, the programmer often has to work hard to pass the
conservative static analysis. Furthermore, unless memory-
and type-safety, and control flow integrity are added to the
compiled code, this approach is not effective against active
adversaries.
Safe dialects of C such as CCured [34] and Deputy [17]
compile with such guarantees, but they require additional
annotations and program restructuring causing significant
programming overhead; sometimes even resulting in the pro-
grammer giving up on the exercise of using these languages
[31, 34]. Further, they attach metadata (such as bounds) to
pointers causing backward-compatibility issues. Although
techniques such as SoftBound [33] can get past this issue,
the runtime overheads are still significant: 82% on average for
CCured on SPECINT95 (maximum 115%) and approximately
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Dynamic approaches rely on (a) program instrumentation
to track the flow of sensitive data as the program executes,
and (b) runtime checks to ensure that it does not leak through
the public channels. These approaches typically maintain
a taint map, that is used to track the taint associated with
each memory address. As data is copied from one address
to the other, the taint map is updated accordingly. At the
public channels, the runtime checks ensure that the taint
associated with the output buffers is public. To guard against
control flow integrity (CFI) attacks, measures such as shadow
stacks, and stack canaries are deployed. While dynamic ap-
proaches prevent leaks even against active attacks, and incur
only negligible programmer overhead, they have substantial
runtime overheads [18, 29, 42, 52], for instance TaintCheck
[36] reports up to 37× overhead for CPU-bound applications.
Our approach combines the best of static and dynamic
techniques, building on two key insights. First, complete
memory-safety is neither sufficient nor necessary for pre-
venting leaks. Like dynamic approaches, we do not rely on
memory safety. Second, we use a novel compiler-enforced
memory-partitioning scheme to keep the runtime cost under
control and avoid fine-grained taint tracking.
We require the programmer to only do minor program
refactoring and add private type annotations in top-level
functions and globals definitions in the program to indicate
private data. The programmer is free to use all of the C
language. Our overheads are 12% on average for SPEC-CPU-
2006 benchmarks (maximum 24%), small enough to be used in
production and significantly better than previous approaches.
We highlight our main ideas below.
Flow analysis and a novelmemory partitioning scheme.
Our compiler performs standard dataflow analysis, statically
propagating taint from global variables and function argu-
ments that have been marked private by the programmer, to
detect any information leaks. However, in languages without
memory-safety or in the presence of low-level attacks, it is
possible that a pointer, which the compiler assumed to be
pointing to a public value statically, actually points to a pri-
vate value at runtime (or viceversa). This can cause a leak. To
prevent this eventuality, it is essential to instrument memory
reads and writes to check that they read public or private
data as expected by the compiler. Our compiler partitions
the program’s memory into a contiguous public region and
a disjoint contiguous private region. Checks for public or
private are then, simple, efficient range checks on pointers.
We describe two partitioning schemes, one based on the Intel
MPX ISA [6], and the other based on segment registers (§3).
Information flow-aware control flow integrity. Hijack-
ing of a program’s control can be used by an adversary to
bypass runtime checks or even jump into the middle of an
instruction to execute arbitrary code. We introduce a novel
taint-aware CFI scheme that prevents such attacks from leak-
ing private data.
Trusted components. Our scheme strictly prevents any pri-
vate data from flowing into public variables. In practice, an
application may want to selectively declassify data at spe-
cific points. To support such declassification, we allow the
programmer to re-factor trusted declassification functions
into a separate component, which we call T . The remaining
untrusted application, in contrast, is called U. Code in T
is not subject to any flow checks and can copy data from
the private to the public region. In fact, T can be compiled
using a vanilla compiler. However, our scheme isolates the
untrusted application U from T by giving T its own pri-
vate stack and heap, and re-using range checks on memory
accesses in U to prevent them from reading or writing to
T ’s stack or heap.
This code partition scheme fits in naturally with design
principles that have been proposed for building secure en-
clave applications [48]. Such applications leverage trusted
hardware (such as Intel SGX [26]) for protection against a
malicious OS. Once ported to our scheme, it was near trivial
to further start using enclaves (§5.3) and offer protection
even against adversaries that may gain root privilege.
ConfLLVM and ConfVerify. We have implemented our
scheme using the LLVM compiler framework [30], called
ConfLLVM. ConfLLVM performs flow analysis on anno-
tated U code, compiles it using the memory partitioning
schemementioned above, and outputs a binary instrumented
with the required runtime checks.
We have also developed a lightweight static verifier Con-
fVerify to check that the binary output by our compiler
indeed has all the required instrumentation. ConfVerify dis-
assembles the binary (using hints provided by ConfLLVM)
and performs dataflow analysis to ensure that there are no
data leaks. Importantly, this allows us to remove the compiler
from our Trusted Computing Base (§5, §6).
Evaluation. We have evaluated our scheme on standard
benchmarks and several applications, both new and existing,
the largest of which is OpenLDAP (300,000 LoC).We find that
performance overheads introduced by our instrumentation
are moderate, and the programmer effort to port OpenLDAP
is only about 160 LoC (§7).
2 Overview
Threat model We consider C applications that work with
both private and public data. Applications interact with the
external world using the network, disk and other channels.
They communicate public data in clear, but want to protect
the confidentiality of the private data by, for example, en-
crypting it before sending it out. However, the application
could have logical or memory errors, or exploitable vulnera-
bilities that may cause private data to be leaked out in clear.
The attacker actively interacts with the application by
sending inputs that are crafted to trigger any bugs in the
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application. The attacker can also observe all the external
communication of the application. Our goal is to prevent
the private data of the application from leaking out in clear.
Specifically, we address explicit information flow: i.e., any
data directly derived from private data is also treated as
private1. Side-channels (such as execution time and memory-
access patterns) are outside the scope of this work.
Our scheme can also be used for integrity protection in
a setting where an application computes over trusted and
untrusted data. Any data (explicitly) derived from untrusted
inputs cannot be supplied to a sink that expects trusted data
(Section 7.2 shows an example).
Sample application. Consider the code for a web server
in Figure 1. The server receives requests from the user
(main:7), where the request contains the username and a file
name (both in clear text), and the encrypted user password.
The server decrypts the password and calls the handleReq
helper routine that copies the (public) file contents into the
out buffer. The server finally prepares the formatted response
(format), and sends the response (buf), in clear, to the user.
The handleReq function allocates two local buffers, passwd
and fcontents (handleReq:4). It reads the actual user password
(e.g., from a database) into passwd, and authenticates the user.
On successful authentication, it reads the file contents into
fcontents, copies them to the out buffer, and appends a mes-
sage to it signalling the completion of the request.
The code has several bugs that can cause it to leak the
user password. First, at line 11, memcpywill read out_size bytes
from fcontents and copy them to out. If out_size is greater
than SIZE, this can cause the contents of passwd to be copied
to out because an overflow past fcontents would go into the
passwd buffer. Second, if the format string fmt in the sprintf
call at line 13 contains extra formatting directives, it can
print stack contents into out ([47]). The situation is worse if
out_size or fmt can be influenced by the attacker.
Our goal is to prevent such vulnerabilities from leaking
out sensitive application data. Below we discuss the three
main components of our approach.
(a) Partitioning the application intoU and T . The pro-
grammer begins by partitioning the application into un-
trusted and trusted components,U and T respectively. T is a
library that provides a small set of trusted routines toU such
as: (1) communication interfaces to the external world (e.g.
networking, I/O, and other system calls), (2) memory alloca-
tion functions (alloc, free, etc.), (3) cryptographic primitives
(for valid private-to-public conversions), and (4) possibly a
small set of trusted declassification functions. All the other
code becomes part ofU.
1While our technique currently does not handle implicit flows, we can
extend it by disallowing branches on private data, or moving them to the
trusted component after a careful audit.
A good practice is to contain most of the application logic
toU and limit T to a library of generic routines that can be
hardened over time, possibly even verified manually [48].
In the web server example from Figure 1, T would consist
of: recv, send, read_file (network, I/O), decrypt (cryptographic
primitive), and read_passwd (source of sensitive data). The
remaining web server code (parse, format, and even sprintf
and memcpy) remains inU and is not trusted.
(b) Partitioning ofU memory by ConfLLVM. The pro-
grammer compiles T with a compiler of her choice (or uses
existing binaries), andU with our compiler ConfLLVM.
ConfLLVM partitions the memory ofU into two regions,
one for public data and one for private data, with each region
having its own stack and heap. To help the compiler lay
out data in these regions, the programmer can annotate
the sensitive data in U using a new keyword private. We
require the programmer to annotate private data only in top-
level definitions, i.e., globals, function signatures, and struct
definitions, and in the prototypes of all functions exported
by T to U. ConfLLVM infers annotations for locals (§5).
The annotations withinU are untrusted. If the programmer
adds incorrect annotations (e.g., does not use the private
annotation for a global variable that is assigned private data),
then either the compiler will reject the program or it will
crash at runtime, but the confidentiality of the private data
will not be compromised. In contrast, annotations in the
prototypes of exported T functions are trusted.
Using these annotations, ConfLLVM lays out stack and
heap data in their corresponding regions (§3). In our example,
the untrusted annotated signatures inU are:
void handleReq(char *uname , private char *upasswd ,
char *fname , char *out , int out_sz );
int authenticate(char *uname , private char *upass ,
private char *pass);
ConfLLVM can automatically infer that, for example,
passwd is a private buffer. The trusted annotated signatures of
T against which ConfLLVM compilesU are the following:
int recv(int fd, char *buf , int buf_size );
int send(int fd, char *buf , int buf_size );
void decrypt(char *ciphertxt , private char *data);
void read_passwd(char *uname , private char *pass ,
int size);
(c) Runtime checks. ConfLLVM instrumentsU with run-
time checks. The runtime checks ensure that, (a) the point-
ers belong to their annotated or inferred regions (e.g. a
private char * actually belongs to the private region), (b)U
does not read or write beyond its own memory (i.e., it does
not read or write to T memory), and (c)U follows a weak
form of CFI that prevents circumvention of the checks.
In addition, T functions must appropriately check their
arguments to ensure that the data passed byU has the cor-
rect sensitivity label. For example, the read_passwd function
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void handleReq (char *uname , char *upasswd , char *fname ,
2 char *out , int out_size)
{
4 char passwd[SIZE], fcontents[SIZE];
read_password (uname , passwd , SIZE);
6 if(!( authenticate (uname , upasswd , passwd ))) {
return;
8 }
read_file(fname , fcontents , SIZE);
10 //(out_size > SIZE) can leak passwd to out
memcpy(out , fcontents , out_size );
12 //a bug in the fmt string can print stack contents




int main (int argc , char **argv)
4 {
... // variable declarations
6 while (1) {
n = recv(fd, buf , buf_size );
8 parse(buf , uname , upasswd_enc , fname);
decrypt(upasswd_enc , upasswd );
10 handleReq(uname , upasswd , fname , out ,
size);
12 format(out , size , buf , buf_Size );
send(fd, buf , buf_size );
14 }
}
Figure 1. Request handling code for a web server
would check that the range [passwd, passwd+SIZE-1] falls inside
the private memory segment ofU. (Note that this is different
from a buffer-overflow check; T need not keep track of the
actual size of allocation of the passwd buffer.)
Our scheme requires that code be placed in read-only
memory and that the remaining memory not be executable
(§6). We do not yet support dynamic code generation.
Trusted Computing Base (TCB). We designed a static
verifier, ConfVerify, to confirm that a binary output by
ConfLLVM has enough checks in place to guarantee con-
fidentiality (§5). ConfVerify guards against bugs in the
compiler.
Our TCB, and thus the security of our scheme, does not de-
pend on the untrusted application codeU and the compiler.
We trust the library code T and the static verifier. We also
trust the operating system and other components running
at a privileged level (although, we can potentially make use
of trusted hardware like Intel SGX to isolate the memory of
our application from the OS [48]).
3 Memory Partitioning Schemes
ConfLLVM uses the programmer-supplied annotations, and
with the help of type inference, statically determines the
taint of each memory access (§5), i.e., for every memory load
and store, it knows statically if the address contains private
or public data. It is possible for the type-inference to detect a
problem (for instance, when a variable holding private data
is passed to a method expecting a public argument), in which
case, a type error is reported back to the programmer. On suc-
cessful inference, no data leaks are guaranteed, provided the
programmer-supplied annotations on T exported functions
are correct. We have developed two different schemes for
enforcing annotation correctness at runtime, each of which
relies on a careful layout ofU memory. The key idea in each
scheme is to contain all private and all public data to their



































Figure 2.Memory layout ofU
this section outlines these two techniques and discusses their
relative pros and cons.
MPX scheme. This scheme relies on the Intel MPX ISA
extension [6] and uses the memory layout shown in Fig-
ure 2b. The memory is partitioned into a public region and
a private region, each with its own heap, stack and global
segments. The ranges of these regions are determined by
the values stored in the MPX bound registers bnd0 and bnd1,
respectively, but they must be contiguous to each other
(bnd0.lower == bnd1.upper). The user selects the maximum
stack size OFFSET at compile time (at most 231−1). The scheme
maintains the public and private stacks in lock-step: their
respective top-of-stack are always at offset OFFSET to each
other. The concrete values stored in bnd0 and bnd1 can be
determined at load time (§6).
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private int bar (private int *p, int *q)
{
int x = *p;
int y = *q;
return x + y;
}
(a) A sample U procedure
;argument registers p = r1, p = r2
sub rsp , 16 ;rsp = rsp - 16
r3 = load gs:[e1] ;r3 = *p
store gs:[esp+4], r3 ;x = r3
r4 = load fs:[e2] ;r4 = *q
store fs:[esp+8], r4 ;y = r4
r5 = load gs:[esp+4] ;r5 = x
r6 = load fs:[esp+8] ;r6 = y
r7 = r5 + r6
add rsp , 16 ;rsp = rsp + 16
ret r7
(b) Assembly code under segment scheme
;argument registers p = r1, q = r2
;stack offsets from rsp: x: 4, y: 8
sub rsp , 16 ;rsp = rsp - 16
bndcu [r1], bnd1 ;MPX instructions to check that -
bndcl [r1], bnd1 ;-r1 points to private region
r3 = load [r1] ;r3 = *p
bndcu [rsp+4+ OFFSET], bnd1 ;check that rsp+4+OFFSET -
bndcl [rsp+4+ OFFSET], bnd1 ;-points to private region
store [rsp+4+ OFFSET], r3 ;x = r3
bndcu [r2], bnd0 ;check that r2 points to-
bndcl [r2], bnd0 ;-the public region
r4 = load [r2] ;r4 = *q
bndcu [rsp+8], bnd0 ;check that rsp+8 points to-
bndcl [rsp+8], bnd0 ;-the public region
store [rsp+8], r4 ;y = r4
bndcu [rsp+4+ OFFSET], bnd1
bndcl [rsp+4+ OFFSET], bnd1
r5 = load [rsp+4+ OFFSET] ;r5 = x
bndcu [rsp+8], bnd0
bndcl [rsp+8], bnd0
r6 = load [rsp+8] ;r6 = y
r7 = r5 + r6
add rsp , 16 ;rsp = rsp + 16
ret r7
(c) Assembly code under MPX scheme
Figure 3. The (unoptimized) assembly generated by ConfLLVM for an example procedure.
Consider the procedure in Figure 3a. The generated (un-
optimized) assembly under the MPX scheme (using virtual
registers for simplicity) is shown in Figure 3c. ConfLLVM
automatically infers that x is a private int and places it on
the private stack, whereas y is kept on the public stack. The
stack pointer rsp points to the top of the public stack. Be-
cause the two stacks are kept at constant OFFSET to each other,
x is accessed simply as rsp+4+OFFSET. Each memory access is
preceded with MPX instructions (bndcu and bndcl) that check
their first argument against the (upper and lower) bounds of
their second argument.
Segmentation scheme. x64 memory operands are in the
form [base + index ∗ scale + displacement], where base and
index are 64-bit unsigned registers, scale is a constant with
maximum value of 8, and displacement is a 32-bit signed con-
stant. The architecture also provides two segment registers
fs and gs for the base address computation, i.e. fs:base simply
adds fs to the base value2.
We use these segment registers to store the lower bounds
of the public and private memory regions, respectively, and
follow the memory layout shown in Figure 2a. The public
and private regions are separated by (at least) 36GB of guard
space (unmapped pages that cause a fault when accessed).
The guard sizes are chosen so that any memory operand
2The segment registers also carry a limit but it is unused in x64.
whose base is prefixed with fs cannot escape the public seg-
ment, and any memory operand prefixed with gs cannot
escape the private segment.
The segments are each aligned to a 4GB boundary. The
usable space within each segment is also 4GB. We access
the base address stored in a 64-bit register, say a private
value stored in rax, as fs+eax, where eax is the lower 32 bits
of rax. Thus, in fs+eax, the lower 32 bits come from eax and
the upper 32 bits come from fs (because fs is 4GB aligned).
This additionally implies that the maximum offset within a
segment that U can access is 38GB (4 + 4 ∗ 8 + 2). This is
rounded up to 40GB for 4GB alignment, with 4GB of usable
space and 36GB of guard space. Since the displacement value
can be negative, the maximum negative offset is 2GB, for
which we have the guard space below the public segment.
The usable parts of the segments are restricted to 4GB to
avoid translatingU pointers when control is passed to T ,
thus avoiding the need to change or recompile T . Generated
code for our example under this scheme is shown in Figure 3b.
The figure uses the convention that ei (resp., esp) represents
the lower 32 bits of the register ri (resp., rsp). The public and
private stacks are still maintained in lock-step. Taking the
address of a private stack variable requires extra support:
the address of variable x in our example is rsp+4+size, where
size is the total segment size (40GB).
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The segmentation scheme has a lower runtime overhead
than the MPX scheme as it avoids doing bound-checks. How-
ever, it restricts the segment size to 4GB.
Multi-threading support. Our scheme supports
multi-threading. All inserted runtime checks (including those
in §4) are thread-safe because they check values of registers.
However, we do need to introduce additional support to use
thread-local storage (TLS). Typically, TLS is accessed via the
segment register gs: the base of TLS is obtained at a constant
offset from gs. The operating system takes care of setting gs
on a per-thread basis. However,U and T operate in different
trust domains, thus they cannot share the same TLS buffer.
We let T continue to use gs for accessing its own TLS.
ConfLLVM changes the compilation ofU to access TLS in
a different way. The multiple (per-thread) stacks in U are
all allocated inside the stack regions; the public and private
stacks for each thread are still at a constant offset to each
other. Each thread stack is, by default, of maximum size 1MB
and its start is aligned to a 1MB boundary (configurable at
compile time). We keep the per-thread TLS buffer at the
beginning of the stack.U simply masks the lower 20-bits of
rsp to zeros to obtain the base of the stack and access TLS.
The segment-register scheme further requires switching
of the gs register as control transfers betweenU and T . We
use appropriate wrappers to achieve this switching, how-
ever T needs to reliably identify the current thread-id when
called fromU (so thatU cannot force two different threads
to use the same stack in T ). ConfLLVM achieves this by
instrumenting an inlined-version of the _chkstk routine3 to
make sure that rsp does not escape its stack boundaries.
4 Information Flow Aware CFI
We design a custom, information-flow aware CFI scheme to
ensure that an attacker cannot alter the control flow ofU to
circumvent the instrumented checks and leak sensitive data.
Typical low-level attacks that can hijack the control flow
of a program include overwriting the return address, or the
targets of function pointers and indirect jumps. Existing
approaches use a combination of shadow stacks or stack ca-
naries to prevent overwriting the return address, or use fine-
grained taint tracking to ensure that the value of a function
pointer is not derived from user (i.e. attacker-controlled) in-
puts [18, 28, 48]. While these techniques may prevent certain
attacks, our goal is purely to ensure confidentiality. Thus,
we designed a custom taint-aware CFI scheme.
Our CFI scheme ensures that for each indirect transfer of
control: (a) the target address is some valid jump location,
i.e., the target of an indirect call is some valid procedure
entry, and the target of a return is some valid return site,
(b) the register taints expected at the target address match
the current register taints (e.g., when the rax register holds a
3https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms648426.aspx
private value then a ret can only go to a site that expected
a private return value). Our scheme does not ensure, for
instance, that a return matches the previous call. We use a
magic-sequence based scheme to achieve this CFI.
CFI for function calls. We follow the x64 calling conven-
tion for Windows that has 4 argument registers and one
return register. Our scheme picks two bit sequences MCall
and MRet of length 59 each that appear nowhere else inU’s bi-
nary. Each procedure in the binary is preceded with a string
that consists of MCall followed by a 5-bit sequence encoding
the expected taints of the 4 argument registers and the re-
turn register, as per the function signature. Similarly, each
valid return site in the binary is preceded by MRet followed
by 1-bit encoding of the taint of the return value register,
again according to the callee’s signature. To keep the length
of the sequences uniform at 64 bits, the return site taint is
padded with four zeros.
Callee-save registers are also live at function entry and exit
and their taints cannot be determined statically by the com-
piler. ConfLLVM forces their taint to be public by making
the caller save and clear all the private-tainted callee-saved
registers before making a call. All dead registers (e.g. un-
used argument registers and caller-saved registers at the
beginning of a function) are conservatively marked private
to avoid accidental leaks. The 64-bit instrumented sequences
are collectively referred to as magic sequences. We note that
our scheme can be extended easily to support other calling
conventions.
Consider the followingU:
private int add (private int x) { return x + 1; }
int incr (int *p, private int x) {
int y = add (x); *p = y; return *p; }
The compiled code for these functions is instrumented
with magic sequences as follows. The 5 taint bits for add are
11111 as its argument x is private, unused argument registers
are conservatively treated as private, and its return type is
also private. On the other hand, the taint bits for incr are
01110 because its first argument is public, second argument is
private, unused argument registers are private, and the return




... ;assembly code for add
#M_call #01110#
incr:
... ;assembly code of incr
call foo
#M_ret #00001# ;private -tainted ret with padded 0s
... ;assembly code for rest of incr
Our CFI scheme adds runtime checks using these se-
quences as follows. Each ret instruction is instrumented
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to instead fetch the return address and confirm that its tar-
get location has MRet followed by the taint-bit of the return





r1 = pop ;fetch return address
r2 = #M_ret_inverted #11110# ;we use bitwise nega -
r2 = not r2 ;-tion of magic string
cmp [r1], r2 ;to retain uniqueness
jne fail ;of M_ret in the binary
r1 = add r1 , 8 ;skip magic sequence
jmp r1 ;return
fail: call __debugbreak
For direct calls, ConfLLVM statically verifies that the
register taints match between the call site and the call target.
At indirect calls, the instrumentation is similar to that of a
ret: check that the target location contains MCall followed by
taint bits that match the register taints at the call site.
Indirect jumps. ConfLLVM does not generate indirect
jumps in U. Indirect jumps are mostly required for jump-
table optimizations, which we currently disable. We can con-
ceptually support them as long as the jump tables are stati-
cally known and placed in read-only memory.
The insertion of magic sequences increases code size but it
makes the CFI-checking more lightweight than shadow stack
schemes. The unique sequences MCall and MRet are created
at load time when the entire binary is available (§6).
5 ConfLLVM and ConfVerify
We implemented ConfLLVM as part of LLVM [30], currently
targeting the Windows x64 platform.
Compiler front-end. We introduce a new type qualifier,
private, in the language that the programmers can use to
annotate types. For example, a private integer-typed vari-
able can be declared as private int x, and a (public) pointer
pointing to a private integer as private int *p. The struct
fields inherit their outermost annotation from the correspond-
ing struct-typed variable. For example, consider a declara-
tion struct st { private int *p; }, and a variable x of type
struct st. Then x.p inherits its qualifier from x: if x is de-
clared as private st x;, then x.p is a private pointer pointing
to a private integer. This convention ensures that despite the
memory partitioning into public and private, structs are still
laid out contiguously in the memory in one of the regions.
We modified the Clang [3] frontend to parse the private
type qualifier and generate LLVM Intermediate Representa-
tion (IR) instrumented with this additional metadata. Once
the IR is generated, ConfLLVM runs standard LLVM IR op-
timizations that are part of the LLVM toolchain. Most of the
optimizations work as-is and don’t require any change. Op-
timizations that change the metadata (e.g. remove-dead-args
changes the function signatures), need to be modified. While
we found that it is not much effort to modify an optimization,
we chose to modify only the most important ones in order
to bound our effort. Rest of the optimizations are disabled,
though we anticipate that some of them can be supported
with further engineering effort.
LLVM IR and type inference. After all the optimizations
are run, our compiler runs a type qualifier inference [21] pass
over the IR. This inference pass propagates the type quali-
fier annotations to local variables, and outputs an IR where
all the intermediates are annotated with optional private
qualifiers. The inference is implemented using the standard
algorithm, where the dataflows in the program generate qual-
ifier subtyping constraints, which are then solved using an
SMT solver [19] at the backend. If the constraints are unsat-
isfiable, an error is reported to the user. We refer the reader
to [21] for details of the algorithm.
After type inference, ConfLLVM knows the taint of each
memory operand for load and store instructions. With a sim-
ple dataflow analysis [12], the compiler statically determines
the taint of each register at each instruction.
Register splilling and code generation. We made the reg-
ister allocator be taint-aware: when a register is to be spilled
on the stack, the compiler appropriately chooses the private
or the public stack depending on the taint of the register.
Once the LLVM IR is lowered to machine IR, ConfLLVM
emits the assembly code inserting all the checks for memory
bounds and CFI.
MPX Optimizations. ConfLLVM optimizes the bounds-
checking in the MPX scheme. MPX instruction operands are
identical to x64 memory operands, therefore one can check
bounds of a complex operand using a single instruction.
However, we found that bounds-checking a register is faster
than bounds-checking a memory operand (perhaps because
using a memory operand requires an implicit lea).
ConfLLVM optimizes the checks to be on a register as
much as possible. It reserves 1MB of space around the public
and private regions as guard regions and eliminates the dis-
placement in each memory operand if its absolute value
is smaller than 220. Usually the displacement value is a
small constant (for accessing structure fields or doing stack
accesses) and this optimization applies to a large degree.
Further, by enabling the _chkstk enforcement for the MPX
scheme also (§3), ConfLLVM eliminates checks on stack ac-
cesses altogether because the rsp value is bound to be within
the public region (and rsp+OFFSET is bound to be within the
private region).
ConfLLVM further coalesces MPX checks within a basic
block. Before adding a check, it confirms if the same check
was already added previously in the same block without
subsequent modifications to its the base or index registers.
7
Ajay Brahmakshatriya, Piyus Kedia, Derrick P. McKee, Pratik Bhatu, Deepak Garg, Akash Lal, and Aseem Rastogi
5.1 ConfVerify
We have developed ConfVerify to check that a binary pro-
duced by ConfLLVM has the required instrumentation in
place to guarantee that there are no (explicit) private data
leaks. The design goal of ConfVerify is to guard against
bugs inConfLLVM; it is not a general-purpose verifiermeant
for arbitrary binaries. ConfVerify actually helped us catch
bugs in ConfLLVM during its development.
ConfVerify is only 1500 LOC in addition to an off-the-
shelf disassembler that it uses for CFG construction4 (as
compared to 5MLOC for ConfLLVM), and therefore, much
easier to manually audit. It lacks all the complexities of Con-
fLLVM (such as register allocation, optimizations, etc.), and
uses a simple dataflow analysis to check all the flows. Con-
sequently, it provides a higher degree of assurance for the
security of our scheme.
ConfVerify requires the unique prefixes of magic se-
quences (§4) as input and uses them to identify procedure
entries in the binary. It starts disassembling the procedures
and constructs their control-flow graph (CFG). ConfVerify
assumes that the binary satisfies CFI, which makes it possible
to reliably identify all instructions in a procedure. If the disas-
sembly fails, the binary is rejected. Otherwise, ConfVerify
checks its assumptions: that the magic sequences were in-
deed unique in the procedures identified and that they have
enough CFI checks.
Next, ConfVerify performs a dataflow analysis on the
constructed CFG to determine the taints of all the registers
at each instruction. It starts by picking the taint bits of the
magic sequence preceding the procedure (which makes the
analysis modular). It looks for MPX checks or the use of
segment registers to identify the taints of memory operands;
if it cannot find a check in the same basic block, the verifica-
tion fails. For each store instruction, it checks that the taint
of the destination operand matches the taint of the source
register. For direct calls, it checks that the expected taints
of the arguments, as encoded in the magic sequence at the
callee, matches the taints of the argument registers at the
callsite (this differs from ConfLLVM which uses functions
signatures). For indirect control transfers (indirect calls and
ret), ConfVerify confirms that there is a check for the magic
sequence at the target site and that its taint bits match the
inferred taints for registers. After a call instruction, Con-
fVerify picks up taint of the return register from the magic
sequence (there should be one), marks other all caller-save
registers as private, and callee-save registers as public (fol-
lowing ConfLLVM’s convention).
ConfVerify additionally makes sure that a direct or a con-
ditional jump can only go a location in the same procedure.
ConfVerify rejects a binary that has an indirect jump, a
system call, or if it modifies a segment register. ConfVerify
also confirms correct usage of _chkstk to ensure that rsp is
4We use the LLVM disassembler.
kept within stack bounds. When using the segment-register
scheme, ConfVerify additionally checks that each memory
operand uses the lower 32-bits of registers.
5.2 Security analysis
We present an informal security argument for ConfVerify,
leaving the formal security proofs as future work.
For every program instruction, ConfVerify maintains
the invariant that there is no (explicit) data flow from private
operands to public operands. To do this, ConfVerify stati-
cally computes the taints of the instruction operands.
For registers, ConfVerify computes the incoming and
outgoing taint map for each instruction using a data flow
analysis. For memory operands, instead of relying on user
annotations or pointer analyses, ConfVerify uses the run-
time bounds check that precedes the instruction. Thus, at
runtime, either a bounds check fails, causing the program to
crash, or the memory operands have taints that ConfVerify
computes for them.
ConfVerify analysis is modular: it is a per-procedure
analysis that starts from the taint summary magic sequence
preceding the procedure, and checks for the invariant; the
summaries are statically checked at the call sites. Finally, the
CFI checks enforce the invariant for indirect control transfers.
At runtime, either the CFI checks fail, or the registers have
taints as expected by the target program location. Thus, CFI
attacks could hijack the control flow, but they cannot subvert
the enforced register taints, and hence the invariant.
5.3 Protection against a malicious Operating System
Our scheme, by itself, does not offer protection against an
adversary with root privileges. However, our setup lends it-
self naturally to leverage hardware-isolation technology like
Intel SGX [26] for protection against a malicious operating
system. SGX allows a user-mode application to create en-
claves, which are regions of memory that appear encrypted
to the OS. Code executing outside the enclave cannot access
memory inside the enclave, although the reverse is allowed.
When using our techniques, an application can stop pri-
vate data from leaking to the OS by simply mapping the
private region of memory inside an enclave. Further, the
code for bothU and T , as well as T ’s stack and heap, must
be inside the enclave. However, any application code that
does not require access to private data can be placed outside
the enclave and executed without instrumentation on the
public stack: ConfLLVM guarantees that corruption of pub-
lic data or the public stack cannot induce a leak of private
data. Further, the hardware guarantees that code outside the
enclave cannot touch (private) data inside the enclave.
In our experience, once theU-T partitioning of code is
done, very little work is required to use enclaves (§7.2).
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6 Toolchain
This section describes the overall flow to launch an applica-
tion using our toolchain.
Compiling U using ConfLLVM. Recall that the only
external functions in the U code are T functions; all ex-
ternal communication of U happens via T . The U code
is compiled with an (auto-generated) stub file, that imple-
ments each of these T functions as an indirect jump from
a table externals, located at a constant position in U (e.g.
jmp (externals + offset)i for the i-th function). The table
externals is initialized with zeroes at this point, and Con-
fLLVM links all theU files to produce aU dll.
TheU dll is then postprocessed to patch all the references
to globals, so that they correspond to the correct (private or
public) region. The globals themselves are relocated by the
loader. The postprocessing pass also sets the 59-bit prefix
for the magic sequences (used for CFI, §4). We find these
sequences by generating random bit sequences and checking
for uniqueness; usually a small number of iterations suffice.
Wrappers for T functions. For each of the functions in
T ’s interface exported toU, we write a small wrapper that:
(a) performs the necessary checks for the arguments (e.g.
the send wrapper would check that its argument buffer is
contained in the public region), (b) copies arguments to T ’s
stack, (c) switches gs, (d) switches rsp to T ’s stack, and (e)
calls the corresponding T function underneath (e.g. send in
libc). On return, it (f) switches gs and rsp back and jumps to
U in a similar manner as our CFI return instrumentation.
Additionally, the wrappers include the magic sequence sim-
ilar to those in U so that the CFI checks in U do not fail
when calling T . These wrappers are compiled with the T
dll, and the output dll exports the interface functions.
Memory allocation. To support the public-private memory
partitioning ofU,T must offer allocation routines for obtain-
ing memory in the public and private sections, respectively.
We created wrappers of malloc in T to offer this functionality.
Loading the U and T dlls. When loading the U and T
dlls, the loader: (1) populates the externals table in U with
addresses of the wrapper functions in T , (2) relocates the
globals in U to their respective, private or public regions,
(3) sets the MPX bound registers for the MPX scheme or
the segment registers for the segment-register scheme, and
(4) initializes the heaps and stacks in all the regions, marks
them non-executable, and jumps to the main routine.
7 Evaluation
The goal of our evaluation is three-fold: (a) Quantify the per-
formance overheads of ConfLLVM’s instrumentation, both
for enforcing bounds and for enforcing CFI; (b) Quantify nec-
essary code changes in existing applications to enable them
to be compiled by ConfLLVM; (c) Check that our scheme
actually stops confidentiality exploits in applications.
7.1 CPU benchmarks
We measured the overheads of ConfLLVM’s instrumenta-
tion on the standard SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks [10]. We
treat the code of the benchmarks as untrusted (in U), but
libc functions are trusted (in T ). Since these benchmarks
use no private data, we added no annotations to the bench-
marks, which makes all data public by default. Nonetheless,
the code emitted by ConfLLVM ensures that all memory
accesses are actually in the public region, it enforces CFI,
and switches stacks when calling T functions, so this exper-
iment accurately captures ConfLLVM’s overheads. We ran
the benchmarks in the following configurations.
- Base: Benchmarks compiled with vanilla LLVM, with
O2 optimizations. This is the baseline for evaluation.5
- BaseOA: ConfLLVM requires the use a customized
memory allocator since the Windows system allocator
does not support multiple heaps. The configuration
BaseOA is benchmarks compiled with vanilla LLVM
but running with our custom allocator.
- OurBare: Compiled with ConfLLVM, but without any
runtime instrumentation. However, all optimizations
unsupported by ConfLLVM are disabled and stacks
are switched in calling T functions fromU.
- OurCFI: Like OurBare but additionally with CFI instru-
mentation, but no memory bounds enforcement.
- OurMPX: Full ConfLLVM, using MPX scheme.
- OurSeg: Full ConfLLVM, using segmentation scheme.
Briefly, the difference between OurCFI and OurBare is the
cost of our CFI instrumentation. The difference between
OurMPX (resp. OurSeg) and OurCFI is the cost of enforcing
bounds using MPX (resp. segment registers).
All benchmarks were run on a Microsoft Surface Pro-4
Windows 10 machine with an Intel Core i7-6650U 2.20 GHz
64-bit processor with 2 cores (4 logical cores) and 8 GB RAM.
Table 4 shows the results, averaged over ten runs. The num-
bers in the first column are run times in seconds. The re-
maining columns report percentage changes, relative to the
first column. The standard deviations were all below 3%.
The overhead of ConfLLVM using MPX (OurMPX) is up
to 74.03%, while that of ConfLLVM using segmentation
(OurSeg) is up to 24.5%.6 As expected, the overheads are
almost consistently significantly lower when using segmen-
tation than when using MPX. Looking further, some of
the overhead (up to 10.2%) comes from CFI enforcement
(OurCFI−OurBare), although the average CFI overhead is
5O2 is the standard optimization level for performance evaluation. Higher
levels include “optimizations” that don’t always speed up the program.
6The overheads of MPX may seem high, especially given that MPX was
designed to make memory-bounds checking efficient. However, Oleksenko
et al.’s recent, systematic investigation of MPX overheads has found very
similar overheads [37].
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Name Base(s) BaseOA OurBare OurCFI OurSeg OurMPX
gcc 272.36 -5.92% 0.17% 3.37% 5.48% 12.32%
gobmk 395.62 0.08% 4.32% 13.66% 20.90% 33.13%
hmmer 128.63 0.16% -2.54% -2.50% 1.16% 65.09%
h264ref 365.13 -0.63% 6.96% 17.12% 22.20% 74.03%
lbm 208.80 0.82% 6.78% 7.06% 10.63% 11.84%
bzip2 406.33 -0.47% 3.39% 4.62% 10.19% 40.95%
mcf 280.06 1.32% 2.11% 4.17% 3.69% 4.02%
milc 438.60 -8.81% -7.61% -7.17% -6.40% -3.22%
libquantum 263.8 2.76% 3.831% 6.25% 17.89% 40.75%
sjeng 424.46 0.01% 12.61% 19.75% 24.5% 48.9%
sphinx3 438.6 0.93% 1.74% 5.26% 9.93% 30.30%
Figure 4. SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks in different configura-
tions. Percentages are overheads relative to the first column.
3.62%, competitive with best known techniques [18]. Stack
switching and disabled optimizations (OurBare) account for
the remaining overhead. The overhead due to our custom
memory allocator (BaseOA) is negligible and, in many bench-
marks, the custom allocator improves performance.
We further comment on some seemingly odd results. On
mcf, the cost of CFI alone (OurCFI, 4.17%) seems to be higher
than that of the full MPX-based instrumentation (OurMPX,
4.02%). We verified that this is due to an outlier in OurCFI
experiment. On hmmer, the overhead of OurBare is negative
because the optimizations that ConfLLVM disables actually
slow it down. Finally, on milc, the overhead of ConfLLVM is
negative because this benchmark benefits significantly from
the use of our custom memory allocator. Indeed, relative to
BaseOA, the remaining overheads follow expected trends.
7.2 Simple applications
Next, we consider two simple, end-to-end applications and
measure specific aspects of performance on them.
A mongoose-based web server We consider a simple,
single-threaded web server that uses, and ships as part of,
the Mongoose embedded web server library [8] v6.7. This
standard library provides all the useful functions; and the
web server is a thin wrapper around it. We modified the
library and the web server to serve public and private text
files, identified by the extensions ‘.txt’ and ‘.ptxt’, respec-
tively. The server encrypts private files prior to transmission.
To read data from a private file, we wrote a trusted T wrap-
per function read_priv around the standard library function
read, which reads a file. The new function read_priv behaves
exactly like read, but returns the data read in a private buffer,
which is passed as the second argument.
size_t read_priv(int fd, private char* buffer ,
size_t to_read );
We also wrote an encryption function in T that takes a
private buffer with plain text and returns a public buffer
with cipher text. This function is used to encrypt private
files read by read_priv. The rest of the server, including the
Mongoose library, remains inU. This ensures that private
data returned via read_priv cannot be leaked unencrypted.
Overall, we changed 5 LoC in the Mongoose library code,
and 20 lines in the web server code.
We ran performance (throughput) measurements on this
simple web server, by compiling it with avanilla LLVM and
with ConfLLVM, using segmentation for enforcing bounds.
In both cases, we the same machine that we used for the
SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks.
We created 6 processes on the server machine, each run-
ning one instance of the server, and connected to them using
36 parallel client threads on a different machine, over a 1Gbps
direct link. The clients request medium-sized (16KB) files in
succession. All files are already cached inmemory. This setup
suffices to saturate the server’s CPU in both the baseline and
with ConfLLVM. Over 10 runs, the baseline is able to handle,
on average 6,703 requests per second (std. dev. 2.1%), while
the server compiled with ConfLLVM (segmentation) is able
to handle 6,629 requests per second (std. dev. 2.3%). This
amounts to a throughput degradation of approximately 1.1%,
which is within the experimental error. The reason for this
extremely low overhead is that whileU contains the most
complex and error-prone parts of the web server (like the
http request parser), the dominant cost is that of copying data
in read/write libraries (which are in T ) and in the network
stack, neither of which is affected by our instrumentation.
Consequently, the overheads are insignificant.
Enclaves.We used the Mongoose web server to further test
our design in combination with SGX enclaves as described in
Section 5.3. It only required a day’s worth of additional effort
to use Intel’s SDK for SGX [27] and run the web server inside
an enclave (the SDK now becomes part of T ). The private
memory segment was mapped inside the enclave, supported
by the SDK’s memory allocator, whereas the public stack
and heap were located outside. The use of enclaves reduced
the throughput by ∼44%, due to the cost of switching con-
trol in and out of the enclave to make system calls (which
happen frequently in a web server). However, this additional
overhead is orthogonal to our techniques and can be reduced
with further engineering effort.
Isolating system library services Our design enables im-
plementing a system service like a file system as a shared
userspace library, and isolating it from an untrusted client
program in the same address space. As an example, we
wrote a small multithreaded, shared userspace library that
offers file read and write functions. Internally, the library
memory-maps open files, and serves and updates file con-
tents through memory copy. The library also provides in-
tegrity by maintaining a Merkle hash tree of the file system’s
contents, at the granularity of file system blocks (512 bytes).
10
An Instrumenting Compiler for Enforcing Confidentiality in Low-Level Code
Threads Base OurSeg OurMPX
1 16.0 17.5 (9.38%) 18.6 (16.25%)
2 16.4 18.0 (9.76%) 19.1 (16.46%)
4 17.5 19.1 (9.14%) 20.2 (15.43%)
6 26.1 28.7 (9.96%) 30.5 (16.85%)
Figure 5. Total time, in seconds, for reading a 2GB file in
parallel, as a function of the number of threads. Numbers in
parenthesis are overheads relative to Base.
The obvious security concern is that malicious or buggy
applications may clobber the hash tree and nullify the in-
tegrity guarantees. To alleviate this concern we compile both
the library and its clients using ConfLLVM (i.e. as part of
U). All data within the client is marked private, while the
integrity-sensitive datastructures of the library, including
the hash tree, are marked public (the library can also work
with the private data). While marking the library data public
and the client data private may sound backwards, note that
the goal is here is to protect the integrity, not the confiden-
tiality, of library data. Marking the data this way prevents
compromised clients from clobbering library data structures.
It also prevents the library from accidentally copying client
data into its own data structures. Finally, we also prevent
clients from calling internal library functions directly (for
this, we use different magic sequences for the client and the
library). Client calls to the library functions are mediated
through wrapper functions in T , that switch back and forth
between the library’s public stack and the client’s stack7.
We experiment with this library on a Windows 10 ma-
chine with an Intel i7-6700 CPU (4 cores, 8 hyperthreaded
cores) and 32 GB RAM. Our client program creates between
1 and 6 parallel threads, all of which read a 2 GB file con-
currently. The file is memory-mapped within the library
and cached previously. This gives us a CPU-bound work-
load. We measure the total time taken to perform the reads
in three configurations: Base, OurSeg and OurMPX. Table 5
shows the total runtime (in seconds) as a function of the
number of threads and the configuration, averaged across
5 runs. The standard deviations are negligible, all below 3%.
Until the number of threads exceeds the number of cores (4),
the time and relative overhead of our scheme remain nearly
constant. This establishes linear scaling with the number
of threads. The actual overhead of OurSeg is below 10% and
that of OurMPX is below 17% in this experiment.
7.3 OpenLDAP
In order to show that ConfLLVM can scale to large appli-
cations, we use it to compile the OpenLDAP project [38].
7An alternative design could be to move the entire library to T, while
keeping the application in U. Compared to our design, this design has the
disadvantage that it does not prevent bugs in the library from accidentally
copying application data into its critical data structures.
OpenLDAP is an open source implementation of the Light-
weight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) proposed by IETF
RFC 4511 [44]. LDAP provides a standardized way of orga-
nizing information in an application-defined hierarchical
structure, as well as accessing the information over a net-
work. We use OpenLDAP version 2.4.45. This version has
300,000 lines of C code, across 728 source files. We configure
OpenLDAP as a multi-threaded server (the default) with a
memory-mapped backing store (also the default), and simple
username/password authentication.
By default, OpenLDAP stores two types of passwords:
1) A password for each user in the database; authenticating
with this password provides access to specific parts of the
database, and 2) A root password that gives access to the
entire backing store. We modified the source code to protect
both types of passwords. This was achieved by modifying
100 lines of code, adding 52 lines of new T code, and moving
9 lines of existing code into T . In total, these constitute about
0.5% of the existing code base.
We briefly describe our code changes and additions. In
OpenLDAP, the root password is stored in a configuration
file that is read during initialization. To protect the root pass-
word, we moved the root password to a different location and
added a T function to read the password from this location
into a private buffer. Subsequently, ConfLLVM guarantees
that this password cannot leak to the public region. To pro-
tect user passwords, we changed OpenLDAP to encrypt these
passwords when they are written to the backing store and
to decrypt them when they are read back. The functions to
encrypt and decrypt are in T . Importantly, the decryption
function returns the decrypted password in a private buffer.
ConfLLVM then prevents this password from leaking.
We perform two throughput experiments on OpenLDAP
compiled with ConfLLVM. We use MPX for bounds checks,
as opposed to segmentation, since we know from the SPEC
CPU benchmarks that MPX is worse for ConfLLVM. We use
the same machine as for the SPEC CPU benchmarks to host
an OpenLDAP server configured to run 6 concurrent threads.
The server is pre-populated with 10,000 random directory
entries and its caches are warmed ahead of time.
In the first experiment, 80 concurrent clients, running on
a separate machine connected to the server over a 100Mbps
direct Ethernet link, issue concurrent requests for directory
entries that do not exist. Across three trials, the server han-
dles on average 26,254 and 22,908 requests per second in the
baseline (Base) and ConfLLVM using MPX (OurMPX). This
corresponds to a throughput degradation of 12.74%, which is
moderate. The server CPU remains nearly saturated through-
out the experiment. The standard deviations are very small
(1.7% and 0.2% in Base and OurMPX, respectively).
Our second experiment is identical to the first, except that
60 concurrent clients issue small requests for entries that
do exist on the server. Now, the baseline and ConfLLVM
using MPX handle 29,698 and 26,895 queries per second,
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respectively. This is a throughput degradation of 9.44%. The
standard deviations are small (less than 0.2% in both cases).
The reason for the difference in overheads in these two
experiments is that OpenLDAP does less work (inU) look-
ing for directory entries that exist than it does looking for
directory entries that don’t exist. Although the overheads
are already moderate, we expect they can be reduced further
by using segmentation in place of MPX.
7.4 Vulnerability-injection experiments
To test that ConfLLVM actually stops data extraction vulner-
abilities from being exploited, we hand-crafted vulnerabili-
ties in three applications. First, in the Mongoose-based web
server of Section 7.2, we added a buffer-bounds vulnerability
to the code path for serving a public file. The vulnerability
transmits any amount of stale data from the stack, unen-
crypted. We wrote a client that exploits the vulnerability by
first requesting a private file, which causes some contents of
the private file to be written to the stack in clear text, and
then requesting a public file with the exploit. This causes
stale private data from the first request to be leaked. Using
ConfLLVM stops the exploit since ConfLLVM separates the
private and public stacks. The contents of the private file are
written to the private stack but the vulnerability reads from
the public stack.
Second, wemodifiedMinizip [7], a file compression tool, to
explicitly leak the file encryption password to a log file. Con-
fLLVM’s type inference detects this leak once we annonate
the password as private. To make it harder for ConfLLVM,
we added several pointer type casts on the password, which
make it impossible to detect the leak statically. But then, the
dynamic checks inserted by ConfLLVM prevent the leak.
Third, we wrote a simple function with a standard format
string vulnerability in its use of printf. printf is a vararg
function, whose first argument, the format string, determines
how many subsequent arguments the function tries to print.
If the format string has more directives than the number
of arguments, potentially due to adversary provided input,
printf ends up reading other data from either the argument
registers or the stack. If any of this data is private, it results
in a data leak. ConfLLVM prevents this vulnerability from
being exploited if we include printf’s code inU: since printf
tries to read all arguments into buffers marked public, the
bounds enforcement of ConfLLVM prevents it from reading
any private data.
8 Related Work
Our work bears similarities to information release confine-
ment (IRC) [48] that proposed a design methodology for
programming secure enclaves (e.g., ones that use Intel SGX
instructions for memory isolation). The code that is loaded
inside an enclave is divided intoU and L, where the former
is obtained via a special instrumenting compiler [16]. This
work argued for a minimal amount of trusted code L and
sandboxedU to restrict all its communication to happen via
L. This is similar in principle to ourU-T division. However,
there are several differences. First, IRC does not track taints
and all data is encrypted by L before releasing it externally.
Thus, the application is incapable of carrying out plain-text
communication without losing the security guarantee. Sec-
ond, their implementation does not support multi-threading
(it relies on page protection to isolate L fromU). Third, it
maintains a bitmap of writeable memory locations for en-
forcing CFI (resulting in time and memory overheads). Our
CFI is taint aware and without these overheads. Finally, their
verifier does not scale even for SPEC benchmarks, whereas
our verifier is much faster and shown to scale to all binaries
that we have tried so far, including SPEC benchmarks.
In a parallel effort to ours, Carr et al. [15] present
DataShield with similar goals to ConfLLVM. DataShield,
however, trusts the user-annotations and the compiler,
whereas in our work, the user-annotations are untrusted
and ConfVerify removes ConfLLVM from the TCB. Unlike
ConfLLVM, DataShield does not protect against control-
flow hijacking attacks; it assumes CFI enforcement through
some other technique. Our CFI scheme is central to design-
ing a modular verifier ConfVerify. DataShield maintains
and checks pointer bounds at the object level for sensitive
data, thereby providing integrity for sensitive data, which
is outside the goals of ConfLLVM. We have evaluated Con-
fLLVM on amuch larger benchmark (OpenLDAP, 300 KLOC)
than DataShield (mbedTLS, 30 KLOC). Further, by making
sure that there is no network or disk IO involved, our re-
ported overheads reflect the true cost of the instrumentation
whereas DataShield’s evaluation had IO, which masked their
overheads, as reported by the authors.
Region-based memory partitioning has been explored be-
fore in the context of safe and efficient memory manage-
ment [22, 50], but our use of private and public regions in
U is the first application of regions to enforce confiden-
tiality. The regions obviate the use of dynamic taint track-
ing, which has been the subject of much research in recent
years [32, 41, 46]. TaintCheck [36] first proposed the idea
of dynamic taint tracking, and is used as the basis for the
dynamic binary rewriting tool Valgrind [35]. DECAF [25]
is a whole system binary analysis framework for program
analysis that includes a taint tracking mechanism. However,
whole system dynamic taint trackers incur heavy perfor-
mance overhead. For instance, DECAF has an average 600%
overhead, and TaintCheck can impose a > 37x performance
hit for CPU-bound applications. Suh et al. [49] report sub
1% overheads for their dynamic information flow tracking
scheme, but unlike our scheme, they require a custom hard-
ware. While most dynamic taint tracking systems handle
explicit flow of information, [51] proposes a binary transla-
tion scheme to convert all implicit flows into explicit flows.
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Static analyses for security [13, 14, 23, 43] use source code
to try to prove some correctness criteria, e.g. safe downcasts
in C++, or correct use of variadic arguments.When proofs are
not possible, runtime checks are inserted to enforce relevant
security policy at runtime. In ConfLLVM, it is not always
possible to determine statically whether an address belongs
to the private or public partition, so we add runtime checks.
Our CFI mechanism is similar to Abadi et al. [11] and
Zeng et al. [53] in its use of magic sequences, but our magic
sequences are taint aware. As already mentioned in Sec-
tion 1, memory safety techniques for C such as CCured [34]
and SoftBound [33] do not provide confidentiality and al-
ready have much higher overheads than ConfLLVM. Adding
confidentialtity on top of them is bound to add even more
programmer or runtime overhead. Techniques such as Code-
pointer integrity [28] prevent control flow hijacks but not
data leaks. And so, their problem statement and even the
details of the solution are very different from ConfLLVM.
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